Most Baghdad security under Iraqi control: US report

This is something you will not see in the main stream media.

WASHINGTON (AFP) - The ranks of Iraqi-trained security personnel grew by nearly 30,000 since April and now control more than half of Baghdad and large swathes of the countryside, a quarterly State Department report to Congress said.
The number of Iraqi-trained security personal was more than double that of US soldiers stationed there -- 268,400 as of June 26, compared with 127,000 current US troops -- the quarterly report said.

A look at the quarterly State Department report to Congress shed even more light on the subject.

The authorized endstrength force structure of the Iraqi Armed Forces is approximately 137,000 personnel, manning one Iraqi Ground Forces Command, 10 divisions and 36 brigade headquarters, 114 Army and special operations battalions, six Air Force squadrons, three Navy squadrons, and 19 combat support battalions. As of June 26, 2006, 116,100 personnel or 84 percent of the authorized end-strength has been trained and equipped. With the initial focus on establishing combat units, attention is now shifting toward the logistics backbone needed to facilitate independent operations. One hundred and six Iraqi Army and Special Operations battalions are now conducting counter-insurgency operations with 81 battalions assessed as capable of operating "in the lead" or independently. Sixty-nine MoD battalions control their own areas of responsibility and ISF have conducted more independent operations than MNF-I in three of the last five months.

The end-strength force structure for all Ministry of Interior forces is 188,200 trained and equipped personnel manning two division headquarters, nine brigade headquarters, 12 Public Order battalions, 12 Commando battalions, three mechanized battalions, and one Emergency Response Unit. The force structure plan is designed to enable a stable civil-security environment in which a prosperous economy and a democratic and representative government that respects and promotes human rights can evolve. As of June 26, 152,300 Ministry of Interior security personnel, or 81 percent of the authorized end strength of 188,200, have been trained and equipped.

The MOD and the MOI are on track to complete initial training and equipping of 100 percent of their authorized end-strength forces by the end of December 2006, at which time the initial build-up will be completed and efforts will focus on replacing losses.

In December 2006, the MOD and MOI will be able to focus almost exclusively on increasing those battalions taking control of their own areas of responsibility and leading their own operations.

In a little over three short years, Iraqi Scurity Frces have taken over half of their own security and by this time next year, will undoubtedly have 100% ownership of their own country. Yes, an insurgency exists and is getting combat experience, but so are the Iraqi Security Forces and Iraqi Security Forces are winning the battle and will eventually win the war. The recent surge in high value targets captured or killed points to this fact. This is the dire state of affairs in Iraq that Zarqawi was pointing to in his recent letter before his death.

Good news is not limited to Iraqi Security Forces. Reconstruction projects are also nearing completion.

Under the IRRF II, the U.S. has programmed $4.2 billion for electricity, $2.1 billion for water, $1.7 billion for oil, $739 million for the health sector, and $99 million for education. The initial focus of these activities was to restore large electricity and water plants neglected by the former regime, with the expectation that rehabilitating existing plants and/or building new plants would be a down payment on what would have to be a larger, long-term program to strengthen Iraqi infrastructure and a stable base for Iraq’s economic growth. Most of these projects are well underway, and nearly all of the large infrastructure projects are expected to be completed by the end of calendar year 2006.

Iraq’s crude oil production has recently increased significantly above 2002 pre-war levels. In June 2006, production has averaged 2.3 million barrels a day, above the 2002 average of 2.0 million barrels per day.

Reduction of Iraq’s external debt burden to sustainable levels, another top priority for Iraq’s economic development, is a key component of U.S. donor coordination. In November 2004, the Paris Club group of creditors agreed to forgive, in phases, 80 percent of the approximately $40 billion in Iraqi debt held by its members.

The report concludes with:

Security transition will occur when four criteria are met:

1. Implementation of Partnerships—MNF-I and its Major Subordinate Commands must establish and maintain partnerships across the entire spectrum of Iraqi Security Forces units, from battalion through to ministerial level;
2. Achievement of Iraqi Army Lead (IAL)—Process during which Iraqi Army units progress through stages of capability from unit formation to the ability to conduct counter-insurgency operations;
3. Attainment of Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)—Iraqi civil authorities satisfy the conditions required to assume control and exercise responsibility for the security of their respective provinces. This is achieved by attaining the previously mentioned four criteria: the ability of Coalition forces to reinforce the ISF if necessary; readiness and capabilities of ISF; levels of present and projected insurgent activity; and the readiness and capabilities of relevant government institutions; and
4. Iraqi Security Self-Reliance—The Government of Iraq achieves PIC (or a combination of PIC and IAL) throughout Iraq; and the government, through its security ministries, is capable of planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and forces.

These criteria are not sequential. Iraqi forces do not have to assume the lead in each governorate before Coalition forces may begin transfer of provincial control in governorates where all conditions, including Iraqi Security Forces lead for security, have already been established.

This is the exit strategy out of Iraq as opposed to a timetable. The report expresses the disasterous effects of using a timetable as an exit strategy.

Again, arbitrary timetables for withdrawal of Coalition forces—divorced from conditions in Iraq and the region—would be a serious strategic error, as they would suggest to the enemy that they can simply wait to win. No war has ever been won on a timetable, and neither will this one be. Lack of a timetable, however, does not mean that the Coalition’s posture in Iraq is static. On the contrary, the Coalition continually adjusts its posture and approaches as conditions evolve and Iraqi capabilities grow.

Iraqis are in line for a nice Christmas present at the end of the year. The presents will be stability, security, self-government, and economic progress. The beacon of democracy in the Middle East is not only lit for all others to see, but it is beginning to shine very bright and will guide several other countries in the region. This is a far cry from the death and destruction Saddam was leading his country to just three short years ago.