Report: Iranians Behind Recent Attacks In Iraq

From MEMRI.

Qassem Ata, spokesman for the Baghdad Security Plan, has warned residents of the city of possible suicide operations by Iranian infiltrators in holy places during the 'Eid Al-Fitr holiday. He said that Iranians who had infiltrated into Iraq were behind recent suicide attacks in the country.

Iran has recently pushed Special Group operatives across the border into Iraq to continue to promote instability in the region. Iraq's ability to thwart these attacks will be a test of their ability to maintain security in their country. The full analysis of these Special Groups is in the above link.

Armed groups cross into Iraq for attacks

From Alsumaria.

Dhi Qar police chief Sabah Al Fitlawi affirmed that extremist armed groups that have trained in Iran have entered the country the last past days in aim to execute bombings targeting senior officials. Al Fitlawi noted that these special groups which include each 10 militants have crossed the borders from Iran into Amara City. He asserted that these forces are targeted against officials around Iraq mainly in Al Nassiriya. He clarified that local authorities have intensified security measures and banned circulation of motorcycles.

This action from Iran will be a good test for Iraqi Security and Coalition Forces' ability to track down these Special Group militants and detain/kill them. PM Maliki's recent surges in Basra, Maysan, and Sadr City effectively defeated Special Groups in Iraq causing them to either die in battle, disperse and go to ground, or retreat back to Iran.

Iran has been training Special Groups in an attempt to re-establish their influence within Iran. From this article it appears the training is complete (of at least the first group) and Iran is wanting to re-establish their influence as quickly as possible.

A couple of points here are worth mentioning.

1. Al Qaeda was defeated in Iraq due to its extremism and attacking the population it initially supported. These two factors resulted combined with the surge of American forces to provide seucrity for the population resulted in its loss of tacit support and therefore its unassailable base among the population. The same can be said for Sadr's militia and Special Groups. While initially providing essential services for the population, these entities quickly showed their extremism and attacked the very population which was protecting them resulting, over time, in their loss of popular or tacit support thereby losing their unassailable base leading to their downfall.

2. The capability of the Iraqi Security Forces allows it to protect the population now. Can it defend the country from external major combat operations? No, but it can protect the population from externally led insurgencies and has ties to several people who inform on militants. This fact is how they were able to diminish and almost eliminate Iranian influence in Basra, Maysan, and Sadr City.

3. The Iraqi government is providing essential services now to most Iraqis. While limited, projects are underway for better and more efficient services. Commerce is beginning to take hold in the country, not only in Baghdad, but also in smaller townships. While significant problems still exist, they are being resolved slowly but surely.

4. The recent violence is still fresh in many Iraqis minds. They do not want to return to violent extremism of 2006. Special Groups coming into communities will not be welcomed and I predict will be informed upon. Expect to see ISOF operations in the near future taking down these groups once they attempt to establish a base of operations from which to launch attacks.

5. These Special Groups may get one or more attacks off. If they do, the possible renewed violence will have many groups informing on these Special Groups further limiting their ability to carry out future attacks.

Iran needs to quit these forms of operations as it will only hurt their political and economic impact they could have within Iraq. Iran is still trying to stir up insurrection to keep the US military consumed in Iraq. However, the game has changed and Iraq is moving from a war to nation building. Iran's attempt to bring back a state of war will fail as ISF capacity is now too great to allow large scale open warfare by an insurgency. In addition, Coalition force numbers are still too great to allow this to happen.

There are many within Iraq who would favor much Iranian influence in Iraq; however, not by an insurgency or Special Groups. Iran's major influence in Iraq right now could be political. Trying to re-establish an insurgency will only hurt their political efforts.

The Hezbollah model used in Lebanon will not work in Iraq as Iraq has a robust provincial and tribal influence which makes it down to the normal Iraqi and provides for the tribe. Unlike Lebanon, reconciliation in Iraq started from the bottom up vice the top down. The only places where this model had hopes of florishing were Basra, Maysan, and Sadr City. All of these places and their inhabitants are now better off without Iranian Special Group influence and the people know it. Commerce quickly came back to Basra and Sadr City once Special Groups were contained/defeated. In additon, oil wealth is making it down to these groups already. This fact will only become more and more evident as essential services become more and more robust.

Attacks will also not work as they will only spur popular dissent against these groups.

Iran's best bet at this time is to attempt to influence the government. Unfortunately, its major power brokers in this realm is Sadr and his political members who are walking on egg shells at this time as they have lost popular support especially in Basra, Maysan, and Sadr City. Also unfortunately, Sistani, the revered spiritual leader in Iraq, is very much against a theocracy and has stayed out of polititics as the country develops its democratic ways.

Given its goal of maintaining an isurgency to keep the US tied down, Iran has no other good choice, in the near term, except to bring in Special Groups to continue or promote an bloodshed. While it may get off a spectacular attack, I predict this project will fail miserably as Iraqis are tired of war, are finally experiencing what a free, democratic society can do for them, and are quite frankly liking it.

Once this project fails, Iran will continue to train Sadr and wait for Sistani's death in the hope that they can re-introduce Sadr as an Ayatollah. However, by that time, democracy should be so ingrained in Iraq that this religious influence will be seen as an infringement of democratic rights. That is why Sistani is allowing this democracy to learn and grow without religious influence right now. He understands that while a democracy will keep the church and state separate, a strong democracy can lead to a strong conservative religious movement which can benefit from the power of the secular state.

This fact is lost on leadership of Iran which has a strong religious totalitarian state which must suppress its people to maintain control. However, it is not lost on its people who will shortly see that crossing over the border to Iraq will allow for democratic freedoms they have been lacking for almost 30 years. This fact is what Iran truly fears most. It is a fact which all totalitarian states in the region fear most, and it is why all these states allowed members from their soil enter Iraq to attempt to destroy the young democracy.

For its part, the US must maintain a strong presence in Iraq until successful handover of power from pronvincial and national elections. At that point, the democracy in Iraq will be unstoppable for Iraqis have given what is needed to allow for a successful democracy to persist and flourish. Namely, they have given their blood. The current generation will not soon forget this very gruesome fact.

The Endgame in Iraq

From Jack Keane, Frederick W. Kagan & Kimberly Kagan writing for The Weekly Standard.

On September 16, General Raymond Odierno will succeed General David Petraeus as commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. The surge strategy Petraeus and Odierno developed and executed in 2007 achieved its objectives: reducing violence in Iraq enough to allow political processes to restart, economic development to move forward, and reconciliation to begin. Violence has remained at historic lows even after the withdrawal of all surge forces and the handover of many areas to Iraqi control. Accordingly, President Bush has approved the withdrawal of 8,000 additional troops by February 2009. With Barack Obama's recent declaration that the surge in Iraq has succeeded, it should now be possible to move beyond that debate and squarely address the current situation in Iraq and the future. Reductions in violence permitting political change were the goal of the surge, but they are not the sole measure of success in Iraq. The United States seeks a free, stable, independent Iraq, with a legitimately elected representative government that can govern and defend its territory, is at peace with its neighbors, and is an ally of the United States in the war on terror. The Iraqi leadership has made important strides toward developing a new and inclusive political system that addresses the concerns of all Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups. But it has also taken steps in the wrong direction.

These authors of the surge of American forces in 2007 provide an interesting and insightful analysis of not only military, but political considerations in Iraq. They discuss how and when we should drawdown force, long-term security agreements, and the way ahead to ensure Iraq remains a stable democracy and ally to the United States.

For a full read, click here.

How to Leave a Stable Iraq - Building on Progress

From Foreign Affairs.

The Iraq war has become one of the most polarizing issues in American politics. Most Democrats, including Senator Barack Obama (D-Ill.), want large, early troop cuts; most Republicans, including Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.), want U.S. troops to stay until Iraq's stability is guaranteed. Years of bad news from the front have hardened these divisions along partisan lines and embittered many on both sides. Today, however, there is reason to believe that the debate over Iraq can change. A series of positive developments in the past year and a half offers hope that the desire of so many Americans to bring the troops home can be fulfilled without leaving Iraq in chaos. The right approach, in other words, can partly square Obama's goal of redeploying large numbers of U.S. forces sooner rather than later with McCain's goal of ensuring stability in Iraq.

This article is one of the most comprehensive articles which accurately describes the current security and political situation in Iraq. The authors detail the history of violence in Iraq and how this violence has transformed into a relative, but tenuous, peace.

This remarkable change in Iraq's security situation results from the interaction of AQI's errors, the surge in U.S. troop levels, the growing capacities of the ISF, and the downstream consequences of all of this for the Shiite militias. AQI's first big mistake was bombing the Shiite Askariya shrine in Samarra in February 2006. The attack drew the Shiite militias (many of which had been merely defensive) into the civil war in force and on the offensive, and so began the battle of Baghdad -- a yearlong wave of sectarian violence pitting Sunni insurgents and their AQI allies against JAM and its allies. At the time, Americans saw this wave of bloodshed as a disaster, and in terms of human life it clearly was. But it enabled a later wave of cease-fires by fundamentally changing the Sunnis' strategic calculus. The battle of Baghdad gave the Sunnis a clear view of what an all-out war would really mean, and they did not like what they saw.

When discussing troop projections, the authors cite troop projections are not time, but situation dependent and note that by 2011 it would be possible to reduce our presence in Iraq by half if the security situation remains stable.

Exact projections of troop requirements are difficult to make, but current trends suggest that the United States should be able to cut its presence in Iraq substantially -- perhaps by half -- over the course of 2010 and 2011. Doing so would be contingent on making further progress against the insurgency, keeping the peace during the upcoming provincial and parliamentary elections, and continuing to assist the Iraqis as they work toward healing their sectarian divisions. A destabilizing election, a renewal of sectarian violence sparked by badly handed refugee returns or poor resolution of the Kirkuk dispute, or more destabilizing activity by Iran would change this timing. Any schedule for withdrawal will be subject to the inherent uncertainty of a conflict as complex as the one in Iraq.

While this article is long, it is also extremely detailed and provides a good background and way ahead for US forces in the region.

For a full read, click here.

News From Iraq

I have noticed lately a lack of news from Iraq. I found a couple of items which are representative of Iraqi news.

From the Khaleej Times.

With Kalashnikovs slung over their shoulders, Iraq's first Christian militia enforces one simple rule on the border of this little village. 'Anyone not from Tel Asquf, is banned.'

From the The Post Chronicle.

U.S. soldiers, tipped by Iraqis, found a major cache of bomb-making materials in Babil province, military officials said Sunday. The soldiers discovered more than 2,500 components that could be used to make penetrator-type bombs, the officials told American Forces Press Service. The materiel was found in an area southeast of the village of Samrah.

From Al Sumaria.

Police chief Brigadier-General Sabah Al Fitlawi ordered the arrest of the owner of a virtual company under the name of “Iraq Reconstruction” which has branches in eight southern provinces and Baghdad on account of judicial complaints accusing him of seizing millions of dollars. Al Fitlawi affirmed that arrest warrants against Ali Mohsen Al Rubaie, his father and his brother were issued five days ago on account of citizens’ complaints.

And another article from Al Sumaria.

The political council for national security did not convene to discuss Khanaqin crisis as some Kurdish leaders were not present in Baghdad. Therefore, the dilemma over Iraqi Army deployment in Khanaqin is unsettled mainly that some parties claim that the political council is not concerned with this issue.

These articles are representative of the main news coming out of Iraq in the last few weeks. Citizens are solving local security issues. Coalition forces found and cleared another cache. The police are searching for a corrupt businessman. Political councils are trying to resolve a border issue.

It struck me that several of these issues are also seen in many western democracies. Folks, concerned about security are starting a neigborhood watch, granted, they have AKs, but it is a neighborhood watch none the less.

While there still are explosions here and there, a larger part of the news involves caches being found. In this particular case, the cache was some 2500 components which could be used to make EFPs.

As things have settled down, locals are beginning to wonder where millions of dollars in reconstruction money went and thus are searching for the culprit.

Finally, politicians are getting together to solve the Khanaqin issue. Notice there are not firefights over the issue just parties getting (or in this case, not getting) together to attempt to resolve an issue peacefully.

Make no doubt about it, Iraq is still a dangerous place. However, the intent of the surge, which effectively just ended with the last of the surge forces being pulled out last month were to quell violence by bringing down insurgent groups, provide the time necessary for the Iraqi Army to build capacity so that they could not only police themselves but also go after insurgents, to provide breathing space to the Iraqi Government so they could begin the reconciliation process, and allow the Iraqi Government to begin to govern beyond the Green Zone.

From the articles above, it sound precisely like all objectives have been accomplished. While Iraq will still need to fall under the security umbrella of the US for some time to come, Iraq is beginning to move beyond a young democracy only securing its politicians into a democracy which secures the population, which allows the population to prosper, which allows the population to grow economically, which in turn allows a population to invest in its own future, which brings in immigrants due to superior market forces (more money than one can make in their own country).

Yes, Iraq is fast becoming the beacon of democracy in the center of the Middle East for all other countries to emulate. Yes, there are still problems. Yes, it ain't perfect. But it is a heck of a lot better with Saddam gone, not supporting terrorists anymore, and growing into a vibrant democracy which one would presume would be friendly to the United States.

One point I would like to make. If I were Mullahs in Iran, I would be extremely worried to have such a vibrant growing economy on my borders which houses a majority Shia population. Fellow Shias may begin to wonder why they are not prospering to the same degree. This fact was after all, the strategic objective for going into Iraq in the first place.

Pakistan reopens vital border crossing to NATO

From Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal.

Pakistan has reopened the vital Torkham border crossing point to NATO supply trucks destined for Afghanistan. The crossing point was closed late on Sept. 5, the same day the Pakistani military threatened to retaliate against the US for conducting attacks against the Taliban and al Qaeda inside Paksitan. Pakistan's defense minister said the border closure was meant to show the US that it would not tolerate airstrikes and raids inside its borders, Daily Times reported.

It is interesting to note it is also being put out through other government channels that the Khyber Pass was closed due to security reasons. Whenever there is confusion like this within one government, it usually points to a political vice a security issue. Expressed a different way, the security reason was the excuse to close the crossing but the real reason was political.

As Mr. Roggio points out, the US has conducted many raids within Pakistan recently to include assaulting in forces in helicopters. One of the many reasons Musharraf lost power in Pakistan is his close ties with the US. This mistrust from the people also made it difficult for him to fully engage the Taliban/Al Qaeda in the tribal regions.

Pakistani leaders still want the same ties with the US, but they do not want to run the risk of losing the popular support of the people. So where does that leave them? The Pakistani leadership can express their anger at the US and even close a crossing for a day to show their anger. Standing up in this way to the US endures them with their people. At the same time, they can allow US forces to continue to bomb Al Qaeda positions in the tribal regions to keep Al Qaeda on the defensive, and quite possibly get lucky enough to kill a significant leader here and there.

Since a counterinsurgency is not only a military fight, but also a fight for popularity among the people, the Pakistani government puts itself in a win-win situation. Al Qaeda leaders are taken out which increases the popularity of the government and helps in protecting the population. The Pakistani government protests and occassionally closes a vital supply route to show the US it can affect its supplies to Afghanistan. The people are happy because their leadership is showing them they are not puppets to the US and will stand up for their sovereignty.

I believe Pakistani and US leaders have finally come up with a winning strategy in dealing with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Pakistan will continue to use US high technology to strike deep targets within its borders keeping the Al Qaeda leadership on the run. In turn, Al Qaeda and the Taliban respond to such attacks with suicide bombs against the populous which results in the populous moving against these groups which makes it easier for Pakistan to use its military internally to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Since the key terrain in a counterinsurgency is the populous, winning over this terrain is key to stopping an insurgency. This fact is something Musharraf failed to accomplish but the PPP leadership in Pakistan is focusing on. Only when the population turns against the insurgent can military forces be used effectively to hunt key leaders which run the insurgency. What we are seeing now in Pakistan are shaping operations to win over the key terrain, the population. This ballet between shaping operations and decisive operations will continue until the population is fully won over, at which time we will see more direct military actions. This fact was also the reason why a temporary halt in direct military operations was called for in Pakistan during the month of Ramadan.

Make no doubt about it. Pakistani leaders want to ensure the battle against Al Qaeda and the Taliban are conducted on their terms, meaning defeating these insurgencies while maintaining power of the government. This fine balancing act is what Musharraf was unable to maintain. We will see if the PPP can maintain the balancing act better.

As winter approaches in this region, the insurgents will again go to ground and begin planning operations for next spring. Come next spring, we will see more Coalition troops in Afghanistan who will be able to move out and confront the Taliban. We will see the Pakistani military begin to take the fight more directly to the insurgents in the FATA/NWFP regions. We will see the population in Pakistan come closer and closer in line with the elected government and begin to rise up against the insurgents who will move their operations to the Afganistani side of the border just in time for Coalition forces to finish them off. A year or two from now, Pakistan will have a greatly diminished insurgent problem. As such, Afghanistan will also benefit.

The birthplace of the Salafist insurgency will be no more or will move to another location to begin to rebuild its base of support. Iraq will be a relatively free democratic government supportive of US interests in the region as will Pakistan and Afghanistan. Iran will probably be closer and closer to acquiring a nuclear warhead or will have finally acquired one. But it will be surrounded by a NATO member, Turkey, to the north and US friendly regimes to its west, Iraq, and east, Afghanistan which will have large armies to prevent it from using it fanaticism to "wipe" Israel off the map. Pakistan and India will become partners freeing up their forces to focus on the common enemy in the region, Iran. Who knows, Israel and Syria may have established diplomatic ties by then, further isolating Iran.

With all these US friendly regimes on its borders, intelligence coming out of Iran will be easier as their borders are infiltrated by tribal boundaries which overlap territorial boundaries. Good intelligence is the key factor which prevent wars and if wars become inevitable, its what makes wars winnable.

As I described above what is undoubtedly the long term strategic goal of the US above, it is not by any means as rosy as it appears. Three countries are also vying for control of this region, namely Iran, Russia, and China. Russia and China are two superpowers we know how to deal with. They have established countries and are players in the world economy. They too suffer from insurgencies. They will be easy to bring along as gains in this region will undoubtedly make these countries economically more secure. Iran is the country not willing to be a member of the greater world economy and is the promoter of a global insurgency. It is, in reality, the last unassailable base for radical islamic forces.

It must, in time, be taken to task for support to radical islamists. That is why Iran let us move into and dethrone Saddam. That is why Iran is now supporting an insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. It knows its time will come. It; however, can only delay the inevitable.

Iran’s Fantasy: A Renewed Cold War between "Infidels" Russia and America

From Walid Phares at Counter Terrorism Blog.

The post-Soviet world has never been closer to what we knew as the Cold War than right now. Iran is pleased. We should all be concerned. New proxy conflicts may soon emerge.

Why is Iran pleased?

In Iran, strategic planners knew all too well that even though it was the United States which threatened the regime’s ambitions, it was in fact the passive entente between the old foes of the Cold War that allowed Americans to come so close to Iran’s borders. Hence, in order to reverse the Western advance in the Middle East and, more importantly, in order to escape a democratic revolution against the regional tyrannies, the Russo-American entente would have to crumble. Therefore, the current escalation into what looks like—but is not exactly— a return to the Cold war is a “gift from heaven” to the Iranian regime. For even if these tensions do not climax into a full fledge comeback to the post-WWII era, they will and have already allowed Khamenei and Ahmadinejad to break loose from the containment and isolation processes. Here is how. In the past years after 9/11, Russia worked cooperatively with the West to pressure Iran and its allies in the region at the UN Security Council with the passing of UNSCR 1559 and its subsequent resolutions regarding Syria and Lebanon. Moscow still walked with the international community in pressuring Tehran to cooperate on the nuclear crisis. But in the last few years, Russian-Iranian, and to a lesser degree Russian-Syrian, cooperation began to grow and the attitude of the Kremlin towards U.S. policies in the region became more and more rigid.

Once again, Walid Phares provides an interesting perspective from a Middle East viewpoint. I concur with Mr. Phares. The US needs to ensure we do not resort to Cold War mentality with Russia. We need Russia as a partner against the greater Islamist threat.

For a full read, click here.

Taliban win a fight - and settle scores (- As do others in the global match for control)

From Syed Saleem Shahzad writing for the Asia Times Online.

When several hundred Pakistani troops backed by paramilitary forces on Friday launched an operation against militants in Bajaur Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan on the border with Afghanistan, they received a most unwelcome surprise. News of the offensive, which proved to be the most bloody this year in Pakistan, had been leaked to the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda militants by sympathizers in the security forces, and the army walked into a literal hail of bullets.

In the first few hours, 65 Pakistani Soldiers were killed, 25 were taken prisoner, and several more were wounded. Furthermore, in the article Shahzad notes,

On Wednesday morning, Haji Namdar, the chief of the "Vice and Virtue" organization in Khyber Agency, a tribal region on the Afghan border, was gunned down in his office by Baitullah's men. Although Namdar supported the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan, he was a strategic asset for the Pakistani security agencies trying to wipe out al-Qaeda-influenced radicals and the neo-Taliban. In April, he sold out the Taliban after initially agreeing to help them target the North Atlantic Treaty Organization supply lines passing through Khyber Agency. (See Taliban bitten by a snake in the grass Asia Times Online, April 26, 2008.) Namdar had survived an earlier suicide attack in which about 30 people died.

The above linked story is great read to understand why Namdar was killed. In another story in the Asia Times Online, Syed Saleem Shahzad reviews Al Qaeda's/The Taliban's strategy.

The Taliban and al-Qaeda have with some success squeezed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's)supply lines that run through Pakistan into Afghanistan, especially goods in transit in Khyber Agency on the border.

He continues with the Taliban's two major objectives,

An al-Qaeda member told Asia Times Online on condition of anonymity, "The single strategy of severing NATO's supply lines from Pakistan is the key to success. If the blockage is successfully implemented in 2008, the Western coalition will be forced to leave Afghanistan in 2009, and if implemented next year, the exit is certain by 2010." Several al-Qaeda cells have apparently been activated in Karachi to monitor the movement of NATO supply convoys. This focus on Karachi coincides with two major events. First, the Pakistani armed forces are heavily engaged in fighting against militants in Bajaur Agency and in the Swat Valley in the tribal areas along the Afghan border. At the same time, the coalition government in Islamabad is preparing to impeach Washington's point man in the region, President Pervez Musharraf, mainly over his implementation of a state of emergency and dismissal of the judiciary last year when he headed a military administration

Later Mr. Shahzad notes,

NATO is understandably acutely concerned over protecting its supply lines into land-locked Afghanistan. When routes in Khyber Agency came under attack this year, NATO reached an agreement with Russia for some goods to transit through Russian territory. This alternative is costly, though, given the distances involved, and can only be used in emergencies. Washington tried to get Iran to permit the passage of goods from its seaports into neighboring Afghanistan, but Tehran refused point-blank.

Now we are beginning to see the bigger geo-strategic picture, especially when tying together other players in this region. Iran, to no surprise refused to allow supplies thru its territory. In addition, America has had a pretty timid response with regards to Russia and its ongoing actions in Georgia. Finally, Isreal is also in the mix.

With the eruption of fighting between Russia and Georgia, Israel has found itself in an awkward position as a result of its arms sales to Georgia. Israel is now caught between its friendly relations with Georgia and its fear that the continued sale of weaponry will spark Russian retribution in the form of increased arms sales to Iran and Syria.

So, American supplies lines are threatened in Pakistan, especially with the death of Namdar. The only other option available is bringing supplies thru Russia, who could quickly turn this supply line off if the US interferes with its Georgia operations. Israel, who supplies arms to Georgia, is hard-pressed to continue to supply Georgia as Russia may retaliate by sending more arms to Iran, hindering its ability to reduce a potential nuclear threat from Iran. Finally, we have an article from an earlier Rambling from the Rock post about a naval task force composed of the US, Britian, and France on station at the Persian Gulf with a Russian naval task force in the Mediterranean

All the parties/players in this region are positioning themselves for control in key oil producing or oil shipping regions. A storm is coming, make no doubt about it. Who ultimately comes out victorious may well decide control of this region for decades to come.

Noting the coming storm, all parties may settle for a win-win proposition. Russian wants to reclaim Georgia and have control of its strategic oil fields and pipeline. Israel wants to diminish Iran's nuclear capability, as does all the other players, to include Russia. Russia; however, wants to limit US influence in its backyard, the Middle East, and therefore has no problem giving Iran nuclear technologies to keep the US focused on this enemy and not on its own actions in the Caucus region. For its part, Russia can continue to sell nuclear material to Iran knowing down the road the Iranian nuclear program has a good possibility of being bombed out of existence by Britian, France, the US, and/or Israel.

The staging of its (Russia's) naval task force close to, but in a position to not affect, an allied attack shows its supports Iran, but unfortunately could not come to its aid (in direct action against the US or its western allies which it fears). Therefore Russia continues to have good relations with Iran, possibly beginning again to build its nuclear capability, and in the meantime swallows up Georgia with future sites on the Ukraine. It becomes a winner with more capability down the road.

The reduction of Iran's nuclear ability will be the winning game for Britian, France, Israel, and the US, if they have the nerve to attack. If not, Russia wins this battle also. If they do attack, Russia still wins Georgia and can continue to resupply Iran and maintain influence in the Middle East.

If the US decided to blunt the attack in Georgia and attack Iran, Russia could assist the Taliban in closing the Khyber Pass supply line and close its own, or better yet, keep it open at a hefty cost. Russia still wins, but to a lesser extent. Russia could also decide to supply Iran with better air defense missiles allowing it to still influence Iraq without fear of retribution, thus continuing to tie up Allied forces in Iraq. As it stands now, the coalition just lost another partner in Iraq as 2000 Georgian troops are flying home to defend their country.

All the chess pieces are on the board. Now it is just a matter of future moves, counter-moves, and reactions. The permutations are endless, but the winners and losers are already identified.

Now for a lesson in global politics and strategy. Do you want to be a country in the global politics who can influence and defend its own future path or a country who depends on others to influence its future path? Personally, I want to be part of a country which has major pieces on the chess board to determine its own future path as opposed to a featherweight boxer in the ring with a heavyweight boxer.

The USA is the heavyweight champion in the realm of global politics and strategy. Russia is the contender who has been beaten once but is inline for a rematch. All others are lesser contenders who need the support of either of these two heavyweights to have say in the modern world.

As we move closer to another general election where the candidates are clearly for and against a military or other presence in the Middle East, we must keep in mind what is truly at stake. At stake is whether we will be the heavyweight champion in the region, the beaten contender, or just another featherweight boxer who needs a heavyweights assistance to have any say in global strategy and in the global economy. To me, the choice is easy.

SPECIAL REPORT: Kuwait Readying for War in Gulf?

From the Middle East Times.

The US, Britian, and France are assembling a large naval force in Persian Gulf.

Leading the pack is the nuclear-powered carrier, the USS Theodore Roosevelt and its Carrier Strike Group Two; besides its 80-plus combat planes the Roosevelt normally transports, it is carrying an additional load of French Naval Rafale fighter jets from the French carrier Charles de Gaulle, currently in dry dock. Also reported heading toward Iran is another nuclear-powered carrier, the USS Ronald Reagan and its Carrier Strike Group Seven; the USS Iwo Jima, the Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal and a number of French warships, including the nuclear hunter-killer submarine Amethyste. Once the naval force arrives in the Gulf region it will be joining two other U.S. naval battle groups already on site: the USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS Peleliu; the Lincoln with its carrier strike group and the latter with an expeditionary strike group.

Just how big is this task force and why is it being established?

This deployment is the largest naval task force from the United States and allied countries to assemble in the strategic waters of the Persian Gulf since the two Gulf wars. The object of the naval deployment would be to enforce an eventual blockade on Iran, if as expected by many observers, current negotiations with the Islamic republic over its insistence to pursue enrichment of uranium, allowing it, eventually, to produce nuclear weapons yields no results.

Is Russia also getting into the act or strategically positioning itself where it cannot assist Iran since it would have to fly over Iraq to offer such assistance?

Adding to the volatility is the presence of a major Russian navy deployment affected earlier this year to the eastern Mediterranean comprising the jewel of the Russian fleet, the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov with approximately 50 Su-33 warplanes that have the capacity for mid-air refueling. This means the Russian warplanes could reach the Gulf from the Mediterranean, a distance of some 850 miles and would be forced to fly over Syria (not a problem) but Iraq as well, where the skies are controlled by the U.S. military, and the guided missile heavy cruiser Moskva. The Russian task force is believed to be composed of no less than a dozen warships as well as several submarines.

Only time will tell, but the naval task force being assembled is significant to say the least.

For a full read, click here.

Iran on Its Heels

From Vali Nasr writing for the Wasington Post.

For the first time since 2003, Iran has stumbled in Iraq. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's decision to confront Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army in Basra and Sadr City last month caught Tehran off guard. The Mahdi Army lost more than face: It surrendered large caches of arms, and many of its leaders fled or were killed or captured. Crucially, the militias lost strategic terrain -- Basra and its chokehold on the causeway between Kuwait and Baghdad and Iraq's oil exports; Sadr City and the threat it posed to Baghdad security.

Mr. Nasr ends with,

It is a frequent refrain in Washington that the United States needs leverage before it can talk to Iran. In Iraq, Washington is getting leverage. America has the advantage while Iran is on its heels. Engaging Iran now could even influence who wins the Iraq debate in Tehran.

I could not agree more.

For a full read, click here.

The Ultimate Sadrist Spin

From Nibras Kazimi at the Talisman Gate.

Muqtada al-Sadr throws down his arms at Maliki’s feat in the last act of his months-old saga of surrender; he officially disbands the Mahdi Army to everyone’s disbelief, including mine,

Mr. Kazimi continues,

I read Sadr’s directive yesterday: I have to admit that at first I dismissed it as a forgery, seeing that it appeared on an anti-Sadrist website that had peddled forged statements attributed to Sadr in the past. Not only was the wording weird and disjointed, but Sadr actually demobilizes the Mahdi Army, going far beyond “freezing” its activities as he did twice in the past year. He limits “resistance” to a “group that shall be authorized to do so by us in writing soon” and that they alone were the ones allowed to carry arms. Everyone else must turn pacifist.

This piece is very interesting. Beginning in March, PM Maliki began going after the Mahdi Army and Special Groups. He had success in Basrah and later repeated that success in Sadr City. Now Sadr is disbanding the Mahdi Army while Iraqi Army forces are going after his and Iranian elements in Maysan.

PM Maliki is also using the Iraqi Army against the last remaining remnants of Al Qaeda in Mosul.

Having just returned from Iraq recently, I can honestly say it is quite different from a few years ago. But more about that later.

For a full read, click here.

The Problem With Talking to Iran

From Amir Taheri at the Wall Street Journal.

Mr. Taheri point out why talking to Iran is futile. He points out every president has tried to talk to Iran as has fellow Arab states. All talks have failed. Why?

The reason is that Iran is gripped by a typical crisis of identity that afflicts most nations that pass through a revolutionary experience. The Islamic Republic does not know how to behave: as a nation-state, or as the embodiment of a revolution with universal messianic pretensions. Is it a country or a cause? A nation-state wants concrete things such as demarcated borders, markets, access to natural resources, security, influence, and, of course, stability – all things that could be negotiated with other nation-states. A revolution, on the other hand, doesn't want anything in particular because it wants everything.

Another interesting read. For a full read, click here.

PROFILE: Ali Larijani - New strong man in Iran's parliament

From Monsters and Critics.

With his imminent election as speaker of the Iranian parliament Ali Larijani will not only become the head of the legislature but also the main challenger to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.... Larijani's main political career started in the mid 1980s as culture minister under president Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. In 1994, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made him head of the state television network IRIB. A decade later, Khamenei appointed him as his advisor in the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). An opponent of the reform movement led by president Mohammad Khatami, Larijani ran in the 2005 presidential elections but failed to make it into the second round. Nevertheless, election winner Ahmadinejad appointed him secretary of the SNSC and chief nuclear negotiator.

Larijani is an up and coming leader in Iranian politics. While a conservative, he disagreed with Ahmadinejad on how to deal with Iranian nuclear development and eventually resigned his post as chief nuclear negotiator under Ahmadinejad. He created an alternative conservative movement which won the most votes in parliament. He is also an opponent of the reform movement led by president Mohammad Khatami. He is suspected to challenge Ahmadinejad for the presidency in 2009.

For a full read, click here.

Cat’s Out of the Bag: Onwards to Maysan

From Nibras Kazimi at the Talisman Gate.

Well I guess enough people are openly discussing this now in Baghdad that it’s okay for me to write about it. Mind you, all the following is classified under the category of gossip: The Iraqi Army and the Marines are preparing for a major campaign against Mahdi Army and Iranian targets in Maysan Province (‘Amara). Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki may even put the entire elected leadership of ‘Amara—many of whom are Sadrists—out of a job, by flexing his authority under emergency powers. There is even talk of air strikes against military targets—weapons depots, transportation vehicles and individuals—on the Iranian side of the fence; these are targets that are arming and otherwise supporting the Special Groups throughout Iraq.

The Maysan Province is home to the major ratline of supplies from Iran. It is also home to many Iranian agents inside of Iraq. As such, Mr. Kazimi states,

I expect the battle for Maysan to be difficult: this would be Iran’s last stand in Iraq. The fighting would also be occurring on topographical and human terrain that the Iranians have been studying and cultivating for decades. It could start incrementally, and the ante could be raised as the operation faces increased resistance, eventually leading to bombing runs inside Iran.

The province is worth watching. If a battle occurs in this region, it will mark the formal end of all friendly relations between Iraq and Iran and will fully test PM Maliki and his Security Forces.

For a full read, click here.

Gates: US endgame now close in Iraq

From Alsumaria.

While security forces are pursuing their fight against terrorism and outlaws, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates considered that the “endgame” is now close in Iraq stressing that withdrawal of US Forces will be carried out along a slow process. Yet, he warned of the costly consequences of an early pullout. Gates made the comments in a speech delivered to US special operations forces at their headquarters in Tampa, Florida, recalling the past failures when security was handed over to Iraqi forces before they were ready based on overly optimistic predictions that didn’t necessarily conform to reality. “We must be realistic about the challenges still facing Iraq: al Qaeda remains a lethal force always looking to metastasize and regenerate; armed militias still undermine the rule of law; and the government, while making great strides, still has a lot to learn about how to deliver basic services and security to its people,” he said.

The strategic goal in Iraq is a unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror.

In order to be a unified democratic federal Iraq, it first and foremost must be secure. Security can be provided by US forces, but it is better provided by Iraqi forces. Iraqi forces have now proved they can enter and secure the three largest population centers in Iraq - Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul. In short, it can defend itself.

In order to be a unified democratic federal Iraq, it must provide basic services to its population. This capacity has been built up in Iraq since day one and is currently being built up to a greater extent in Iraq now that the security situation is improving. Security improvements will lead to providing essential services in a democracy. If it doesn't, leaders will not win re-election.

As military capacity and governance increases, Iraq will be able to sustain itself in due course. This is why we must be cautious of a rapid withdraw of US forces. The surge made great strides in Iraq, not only militarily, but also politically, economically, and informationally. A gradual withdraw will ensure these strides are not reverse, but in fact continue forward.

Iraq is proving it is an ally in the war on terror as it is the central front in the war on terror. Our two biggest enemies, Al Qaeda and Iran are being defeated and/or contained in the region. The democratically elected government in Iraq does not want to be controlled by Iran nor does it want to be subjected to the violence that Al Qaeda offers.

The National Command Authorities strategic objectives are close to being fully realized in Iraq. Once these strategic objectives cannot be compromised can we begin to withdraw forces from the region. Timetables have never worked in war or nation building. Benchmarks have been set and are being met, but Iraqis will meet them on their own timeline. Our operational mission as a military is to continue to push them towards accomplishment and assist with security so they can continue to pursue these benchmarks. Tactically, this comes down to defeating Al Qaeda and other militants in the region and assisting the government with providing essential services.

It has taken awhile in Iraq for all parties to come online to pursue the same strategic, operational, and tactical objective, but pursuing they are all doing now. With enemy's of these objectives in full retreat we will see rapid expansion and resolution of our, now combined, objectives.

Red Herring Fatwas

From Nibras Kazimi at the Talisman Gate.

So what happens if the western media can’t spin or sensationalize events in Iraq when not much is happening? Why, they make it up! The Associated Press put out a wire report yesterday hinting that Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani is about to declare jihad against the Americans. Whhhhhaaaaaat???

Mr Kazimi goes on to show how the AP misinterpreted Sistani's statements. Even more telling is this remark.

So let me pull rank here and tell you all that I’ve met Sistani. In fact, I sat in on an hours-long conversation between Sistani, his eldest son who runs his father’s daily affairs, Adil Abdul-Mahdi (Iraq’s current Vice-President) and Ahmad Chalabi. This happened in the early spring of 2004. It was an illuminating discussion that delved into law-making, the role of Islam, history, international relations and of course, gossip.

An interesting read indeed.

For a full read, click here.

Iran cleric blasts US-Iraqi military agreement

From Yahoo via AFP.

A senior Iranian cleric on Friday slammed as treachery to Islam a security accord due to be sealed between Baghdad and Washington on the presence of American troops in Iraq. This agreement shows that "Iraqi tribunals will not be able to judge American military personnel and employees of firms who work for the US military," Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami said during weekly prayers in Tehran.

Khatami then went on to say.

"American forces will keep the ministries of defence, interior and intelligence under their supervision for 10 years... and will be able to have private jails in Iraq," he said. Khatami charged that the accord will allow US troops to launch attacks from Iraq "against any country that backs terrorist groups." "It is open-ended slavery. It is the worst humiliation. "Any hand that signs such an agreement will be considered by Iran as a traitor to Islam, to Shiism and to the Iraqi people," he added.

I find Khatami's statements interesting and telling.

Obviously, he is concerned that the US will have private jails in Iraq which will hold terrorists and supporters of terrorists. The US will be able to attack countries from Iraq which back terrorists and those countries will be humiliated by the US. Finally, if Iraq signs the upcoming SOFA agreement, Iran will consider Iraq a traitor to Iranian Shiism.

If this isn't considered a military, political, and diplomatic victory in Iraq, what is?

Iran will be and is becoming more contained every day and it does not quite frankly like it. It will have US forces on both its western and eastern borders. It will have aircraft carriers along it southern coast. Economic sanctions are having an impact on its country because it refuses to give up nuclear production and state support of terrorism in the region. Its one ally in the region is discussing a formal declaration of peace with Israel.

Again, it is extremely interesting how much different a year makes. The US is in a position of authority again in the region. We could have cut and run last year and lost much of our international clout and prestige, but President Bush decided to surge combat forces to the region. Now, almost one year later from the start of the surge, Iraq is mostly secure, Al Qaeda in Iraq is effectively defeated, the Mahdi Army is subdued, Israel and Syria are discussing a peace treaty, and Iran is feeling contained and alone.

We can argue all day about whether we should have gone into Iraq in 2003. But in 2008, it appears the Bush Doctrine is well on its way to solving many long standing situations in the Middle East.

For a full read, click here.

ANALYSIS: Syrian-Israeli contacts worry Iran, Hezbollah

From M & C.

'Will there be another war this summer?' is a question frequently heard in Arab capitals these days.... Secret, indirect peace talks between Syria and Israel - held since April 2007 with Turkish mediation and publicly confirmed by Turkey and Syria for the first time last week - make no sense at all in this context. Or do they? Arab commentators conjecture that Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is negotiating with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad over the return of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights in order to break Syria's tight embrace with Iran, Israel's archenemy. A commentator from the pan-Arab newspaper al-Hayat wrote that by concluding a peace treaty with Syria, Israel could 'strike Iran in the middle of the heart' and also weaken Hezbollah, which is said to be still getting Iranian weapons via Syria.

If this peace treaty is successful, Assad would get the Golan Heights back, end international isolation, and possibly stave off any further investigation of the Rafik Hariri murder. Israel would get a peace treaty with a as yet unfriendly neighbor to the northeast which would theoretically also weaken Hezbollah in Lebanon resulting in a secure north. There exists a lot of win-win in this agreement for both sides. The fact that a deal has not been struck between the two parties has probably less to do with the benefits both sides would gain from a treaty then the distrust of each of the participants for the other side.

The treaty with Syria would allow Israel to focus on the Iranian nuclear issue without worrying about attacks from the North since Syria would theoretically not violate a new agreement and risk loosing the Golan Heights again. In turn, Hezbollah's power would be greatly reduced without a big brother resupplying them. We need not forget the fact that while Hezbollah did a good job of thwarting an Israeli offensive, they themselves never went on the offensive. Specifically, Hezbollah is a purely defensive entity. The only thing they could do to Israel is fire a whole bunch of rockets into Israel. Doing so without Syrian support would be risky. Once Israel finished with Iran, they could turn their Air Force back onto southern Lebanon.

Undoubtedly, Iran knew these negotiations were ongoing which begs the question. What was their reaction? Amir Taheri reported earlier that PM Maliki did not move into Basra on the offensive, but it was instead a defensive maneuver aimed at limiting Iranian consolidation of power in the south. If true, Iran's reaction was to consolidate power across Southern Iraq extending the Persian reach to Jordan in its quest westward towards the Mediterranean. If successful, this advance would have surely reduced the likelihood of Assad negotiating a peace with Israel. However, it proved unsuccessful. Iran is now weakened and within a few weeks, we hear of secret negotiations between Syria and Israel. In addition, attacks against Iranian sponsored groups, namely the Mahdi Army, continue in their strongholds of Sadr City and Basra, further weakening Iranian efforts across Iraq.

Turkey is not only a mediator, but it is an active participant as it cleans up the PKK problem in the north. While no state in the region wants a fully independent Kurdistan, one which is part of a greater Iraq is less threatening and acceptable for not only states, but apparently the Kurds also. Complete independence for Kurds can be something worked out in decades to come.

Last December (2007) PM Maliki's government signed a "memorandum of agreement" with the Kurdish and Sunni leaders which layed the groundwork for the continuation of PM Maliki reign after national elections in 2009. His recent action into Basra not only further consolidated his power in Iraq with the Kurds and Sunnis, but also limited Iranian influenced control in the South which is why the Sunnis just came back to the government.

Currently, Iraqi diplomats are in Iran proving to the government Iranian sponsored unrest in Iraq. While Iran can continue to deny, the fact that Iraqi officials are showing the Iranian leaders what proof they have is significant in and of itself. It shows the international community, and more importantly Sunni dominated countries bordering Iraq in the Middle East, that while Iraq will be Shiite dominated from now on, it will not be a puppet of Iran. Why is all this important?

In order for a Shiite led Iraq to persist for decades to come, the Iraqi leadership has to show its neighbors it is not a puppet of Iran else it will be in constant conflict with its Sunni neighbors, most notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Turkey. Preventing Iranian control in the south clearly showed Sunni neighbors this fact which is why Iraqi Sunnis shortly afterward returned to the government. Showing Iran directly further proves this point, not to Iran who knows darn well what it is doing in Iraq, but to Iraqi's Sunni neighbors. The uncertainty of continued US presence in the region is only intensifying this diplomacy since that the US sponsored surge has allowed the Iraqi government the breathing room to consolidate power and grow its Army to defend not only its borders, but its interior.

I have stated before The Battle of Basra completely changed the dynamics in the region. The new dynamics are now starting to show themselves. Iran is becoming further isolated which is what all Middle East players wanted. Iraq is showing its independence from Iran and is building up its future role as a mediator between Sunni dominated governments and Iran in the future. No government, not even an uncommitted US has the military to take over Iran; hence, the only way to prevent further confrontation in the Middle East is to continue diplomatic pressure on Iran to further isolate it, just like Syria for the last few years. Syria, seeing the writing on the wall, is closer to peace with Israel in hopes of resecuring control of the Golan Height.

The sacrificial lambs in these latest developments are the Mahdi Army, Hezbollah, the PKK, and Al Qaeda. The beneficiaries are a stable democratic Iraq, a stable democratic Lebanon, a stable Turkish southern border which is doing a banner business with the Kurdish north who can focus its efforts on getting into the EU, a Syria which will be allowed back in the international community, Saudi Arabia and Jordan which no longer have to worry about a strong extremist salafist movement within their borders or a strong Shiite Theocracy in the east, and finally a free-independent Israel which can in the near term focus on Iranian nuclear aspirations and then later on an independent West Bank now that it has a new peace treaty with a former unfriendly neighbor, Syria.

While none of this could have been planned in March 2003 when the United States went to war in Iraq, it was a major tenet of the Bush Doctrine that a democracy in the heart of the Middle East would lead to a more friendly and stable Middle East. If even half of the above comes to pass, the invasion of Iraq would have accomplished its objectives.

The trouble makers of the Middle East will have been tamed. Iraq was made into a democracy. Syria is being turned away from Iran. Iran is being further isolated with not only enemies on its borders, but now US friendly enemies on its borders. Israel is seeing more friendly neighbors in a democractic Lebanon, a peace wanting Syria, and a Saudi government who, below the scenes, is cooperating with them against terrorists. Saudi Arabia is also able for the first time to confront Wallabism as intellectual turbulence created by a violent Al Qaeda has Muslims the world over wondering how they created a force which kills not only fellow Muslims but also innocent women and children. Simultaneously, the Great Satan, the United States, has gained international respect since it is shouldering the military burden of cleaning up the mess which was the Middle East.

Not a bad two terms for President Bush to say the least. The battles currently ongoing are either part of World War IV, continuing battles of the Cold War, or the final battles of World War II, but that is for another article. Whichever proves to be correct, it is why I have always stated that we are doing the Lord's work in with military operations Iraq and Afghanistan and diplomatic operations in the Middle East. Thank God President Bush had enough faith to not listen to defeatist liberals who wanted to pull defeat from the jaws of victory and defiantly executed a surge of forces in Iraq which again, by everything above, has been a resounding success, not only for Iraq, but the greater Middle East, which by the way, was exactly what was intended as part of his Greater Middle East Initiative, which most pundits would say failed, or has it.....

Are Sadr and al-Qaeda Teaming Up in Iraq?

From Omar Fadhil.

A few days ago, there were two suspiciously coordinated statements emerging from Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr made open-war threats followed immediately by a similar threat from al-Qaeda. As they say, there is usually no smoke without fire.

For a full read, click here.

How We'll Know When We've Won

From Frederick W. Kagan at The Weekly Standard. Mr. Kagan reviews the war's objectives in Iraq.

Virtually everyone who wants to win this war agrees: Success will have been achieved when Iraq is a stable, representative state that controls its own territory, is oriented toward the West, and is an ally in the struggle against militant Islamism, whether Sunni or Shia.

So, how are we and the Iraqi government doing in these areas?

Stability. Violence is the most obvious indicator of instability and the easiest to measure. The fact that violence has fallen dramatically in Iraq since the end of 2006 is evidence of improving stability. But critics are right to point out that areas tend to be peaceful both when government forces control them completely and when insurgents control them completely. Violence can drop either because the government is winning or because insurgents are consolidating their gains. So in addition to counting casualties and attacks, it is necessary to evaluate whether government control has been expanding or contracting. In fact, it has expanded dramatically over the past 15 months.

Not a lot of argument about increased stability in Iraq. What about representative government?

Representative government. The Iraqi government is the product of two elections. The Sunni Arabs boycotted the first, with the result that Iraq's provincial councils and governors do not reflect its ethno-sectarian make-up. The second saw a large Sunni Arab turnout and the seating of a multiethnic, multisectarian government in Baghdad. The Iraqi government recently passed a law calling for provincial elections later this year, and the United Nations special envoy to Iraq, Steffan de Mistura, has been consulting with Baghdad about the details of the election, including efforts to ensure that the various committees overseeing it are not unduly influenced by militias or political parties. Surveys show that the Iraqis are nearly unanimous in their desire to vote, particularly in Sunni areas. The Anbar Awakening has turned into a political movement, introducing political pluralism into Sunni Arab politics for the first time. Similar movements, including the splintering of Moktada al-Sadr's "Sadrist Trend," are underway more haltingly among the Shia.

Counter arguments can be brought about a representative government, but provincial elections later this year and national elections next year will show whether or not a representative government exists and can transition in Iraq. What about terroritial control?

Control of territory. The restoration of large urban and rural areas formerly held by insurgents and militias to government control is a key indicator of Iraqi progress. And there are others: the Maliki government's determination to clear Basra and Sadr City of militia influence; Iraqi operations to clear Mosul of al Qaeda fighters; the dramatic growth of the Iraqi Security Forces in 2007 and the further growth underway in 2008. There is anecdotal confirmation of this progress, such as the dramatic decline in the number of illegal militia-controlled checkpoints, most of them set up in and around Baghdad in 2006 for purposes of control, extortion, and murder.

Again, there can be no argument here. Iraqi Security Forces are controlling more and more of their territory as they become larger and more capable.

Orientation toward the West. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Iraq in March 2008 and was warmly received, prompting concern in the United States that the Iraqi government was tilting toward Tehran.... A closer examination shows this to be false.... It has asked the United Nations to endorse the Multinational Force mission supporting it, a mission that includes American forces--but not Iranian ones. It has requested a bilateral security agreement with the United States--and not with Iran. It has determined to purchase American weapons and equipment