So Who Really Won Iraqi Offensive Against Shiite Militias? (HINT: Not al-Maliki)

From Andrew Cochran at Counterterrorism Blog.

Contradictory signals abound in asymmetric conflicts like the Iraqi offensive. An Iranian general who is a designated terrorist played some significant role in the ceasefire, thus vaildating my prognosis. Sadr's backers in Baghdad are claiming victory today, even as U.S. troops patrol their streets. The British are now freezing plans to withdraw more troops from that city, signaling a lack of confidence that the Iraqis will secure the area anytime this year. But an admission from a U.S. Army general in Iraq is telling:

I stated before in this blog that Basra was a test for Maliki. It was his attempt to consolidate his power and weaken Sadr. The Kurds have kept peace in the north. The Americans are defeating Al Qaeda wholesale in the center. Maliki was supposed to defeat Sadr in the south.

According to reports, Sadr's forces were not defeated. I have to concur with Andrew Cochran that Maliki is weakened now since his forces were unable to defeat Sadr's militia in the south. However, the Iraqi Army forces in the south are predominantly made up of Hakim's old Badr Corp. So, not only is Maliki weakened, but so is Hakim. Furthermore, so is Sadr's forces as they have undoubtedly taken a pounding in this battle for control of the south. Politically, this tells me the struggle for Shiite dominance in provincial elections is now up in the air.

This is where I disagree with Andrew Cochran and other commentators about the endstate which is now being forecasted. Maliki is weakened politically, but is not out. Maliki before entered into a memorandum of understanding with Kurdish and Sunni leadership. Maliki's weakened status, as a result of the Basra operation, will cause him to lean more towards respecting this memorandum of understanding, possibly giving a larger voice to Kurdish and Sunni demands.

While it would have been better if Maliki's forces had defeated Sadr's militia wholesale, politics bring together strange bed fellows. This "unvictory" may cause Maliki to honor his memorandum of understanding to maintain political clout. Since Hakim's forces in the south were unable to defeat Sadr's forces, the two main Shiite parties will now split the Shiite vote, possibly giving more influence to Sunni and Kurds as a result of upcoming provincial elections.

The results in Basra politically are not unlike the current American presidential primaries with the Democratic party being split giving McCain a unique advantage in the upcoming general elections. Similarly, the Shiites are split now offering the Sunni and Kurds the ability to get more influence after this round of provincial elections and quite possibly in upcoming national elections in 2009. Both Hakim's SIIC and Sadr's militia are supported by Iran, which may explain why a Revolutionary Guard General from the Iranian Army stepped in to establish a truce.

In effect, the results of Basra has created four primary blocks instead of three. We now have the Sunni block, the Kurdish block, the Sadr block, and the Hakim block. No love has ever been lost between Hakim and Sadr. It was Sadr's hate for Hakim which forced him to throw in his 30 parliamentary seats to back Maliki for PM. With neither block will have a majority in upcoming general elections in 2009. The Sadr block will have to forge a coalition with the Sunni/Kurdish block if they hope to gain influence at the national level. I do not see this coalition happening due to his militia's past activities in sectarian killings. In addition, another coalition between the Sadr block and the Hakim block is now very remote as we saw in the first general election where both parties participated in a unified block. Therefore, the Hakim block will now have to actively negotiate with the Sunni/Kurdish block in any future national government, resulting in a forced reconciliation due to political factors present in a democratic Iraq.

Provincial elections in October 2008 will ensure provincial governments now speak for the people and allow the provinces to pass laws to regulate their provinces. Up until this time, it was apparent only the Sunni voice would be better represented. Now, both Shiite voices will also be represented, just not united. Nation elections in 2009 will ensure the national government is more representative of all Iraqis due to the possible forced reconciliation this "unvictory" in the south may bring about.

There is a silver lining in all clouds. This "unvictory" of Maliki's may very well be that silver lining that continues the process of reconciliation in Iraq.

Finally, Hakim's forces in southern Iraq which make up the Iraqi Army in this region will definitely be re-examined for loyalty and fitness for duty. This fact is not a bad thing. It is in fact a good thing because the loyalty and dependability of these forces have always been an issue. This battle just brings these factors to the forefront. Integration of Iraqi Army forces has happened all over the country minus the south. This battle may very well force more integration.

In addition, it has caused the Brits to postpone their withdraw and may actually get them actively engaged again in Southern Iraq. It has once again bloodied the nose of Sadr's forces which will cause his forces to once again regroup and retrain buying time for American forces to continue to battle Al Qaeda in Iraq. It has exposed the militia-type mentality of Hakim-dominated forces in the south which the military command can now reform.

What now waits to be seen is if Maliki can understand this "unvictory" was not an outright defeat for him and will seek to solidify partnerships in the "memorandum of understanding" he has been publicly avoiding to solidify his base of support. Only time will tell; however, this "unvictory" in southern Iraq does open new prospects for Iraq's democratic future.

This is just another political possibility as a result of the military operations in southern Iraq.