The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later

From Lt. Gen. Raymond T Odierno writing for The Heritage Foundation.

Stories in the press described the situation in Iraq as spiraling out of control. One Los Angeles Times arti­cle discussed the rising level of sectarian violence in Baghdad and how this violence seemed to feed on itself. Placing his account in context, the writer men­tioned that al-Qaeda had detonated a bomb in the Shia neighborhood of Sadr City the previous week, killing over 200 people. This was the latest in a steady run of high-profile attacks since the Golden Mosque bomb­ing of February 2006 in Samarra. And for at least one Shiite living in Baghdad, it was the last straw.

LTG Odierno descibes the political situation in Iraq.

In late 2006, the progress we can observe now was unthinkable. In short, we could hardly expect successful transition or meaningful reconciliation without basic security. Establishing security for the population was a prerequisite for further progress. It was essential. And to make a decisive impact, we needed more combat power and a change in approach.

What helped turn Iraq around?

However, it is important that I mention one other factor that informed our planning and deci­sion-making process. On December 19, 2006, we captured some mid-level al-Qaeda leaders just north of Baghdad. Upon them was a map that clearly depicted al-Qaeda's strategy for the total and unyielding dominance of Baghdad, betting that control of Iraq's capital and its millions of cit­izens would give them free rein to export their twisted ideology and terror.

This map can be found at the Institute for the Study of War. This map was significant in that it described how Al Qaeda in Iraq used the belts around Baghdad to execute terrorists acts in Baghdad. It also showed the disposition of Al Qaeda in Iraq. The map confirmed the American military what had just been written in its new Counterinsurgency doctrine, namely, the decisive point in Iraq was Baghdad and overarching goal of coalition forces should be to protect and secure the population.

It meant changing our mindset as we secured the people where they worked and slept and where their children played. It meant developing new tac­tics, techniques, and procedures in order to imple­ment this concept. We began to establish Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts throughout Baghdad. We erected protective barriers and estab­lished checkpoints to create "safe neighborhoods" and "safe markets," improving security for Iraqis as they went about their daily lives.

To secure the population, American forces established Joint Security Stations in and around the people to ensure their security and protection. They also increased the operational capacity of Iraqi Security Forces to be able to hold ground, freeing up American forces to continue to attack and keep pressure on Al Qaeda in Iraq (Sunni terrorists) and Special Groups (Shiite terrorists).

This multipronged approach resulted in enhanced economic activitiy as the population now begin to go back to markets. This translated into Iraqis giving American forces more tips to sustain their new security and economic actitivity. Partnering up with Iraqi Forces put them in harms way, made them more proficient, and allowed more pairing up with US forces. In the long run, many Iraqi Army units begin to take the lead in fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq and Special Groups.

The complete turn around in Al Anbar provided US forces a model by which to convert insurgents to work for vice against the Iraqi Government and American military. In turn, people were now protected by Sons of Iraq, locals paired with local police, supplemented by Iraqi Security Forces. Al Qaeda in Iraq could now not move back into regions cleared by American forces. They began to flee causing American forces to be able to find them quicker. The situation spiraled out of control for Al Qaeda in Iraq.

In turn, the populous now experienced substantial economic growth and development and begin to turn wholesale against extremists, whether Sunni or Shia. The surge produced hope for the Iraqi people. As hope increases so does anti-extremism. This hope continues to grow and is now present all over Iraq and is beginning to flow out of Iraq to other neighboring countries.

Precisely right when many were proposing we accept defeat in Iraq, we now see almost a complete rout of Al Qaeda in Iraq and to a certain extent a rout of Special Groups. Many times in war, hope is all that is needed to turn the tables on the enemy. We gave not only Iraqis hope but many other people hope in the Middle East. This hope would not have been there if we had pulled out forces in 2007. Instead we surged forces, routed Al Qaeda in Iraq, and gave people of the region hope for freedom and democracy in their future.

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