Iraq President cancels Algiers Accord - Why?

Alsumaria reports that Iraqi President, Talabani has cancelled the Algiers Accord. In the report, it states,

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani announced the cancellation of 1975 Algiers Accord to divide Shatt Al Arab waters saying that the Accord is an agreement signed by former President Saddam Hussein and Shah of Iran under the oversight of Algerian President Houari Boumedienne, and not an agreement between Iraq and Iran.

It further goes on to state,

Talabani stressed that canceling the accord does not contradict with Iraq’s willingness to establish good relations with Iran.

The question immediately becomes, Why?

The Shatt al Arab is a tidal river which begins at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates and leads out into the Persian Gulf. South of Basra, it defines the boundary between Iraq and Iran south of Basra. The waterway allows ocean going vessels to move up into Iraq and Iran. However, according to Fact Monster.com,

Iraq and Iran have disputed navigation rights on the Shatt al Arab since 1935, when an international commission gave Iraq total control of the Shatt al Arab, leaving Iran with control only of the approaches to Abadan and Khorramshahr, its chief ports, and unable to develop new port facilities in the delta.

Further,

The Shatt al Arab flowed through a broad, swampy delta, but the marshlands in Iraq were drained in the early 1990s in order to increase government control over the Arab Shiites (Marsh Arabs) who lived there. Restoration of the marshlands began in 2003, following the invasion of Iraq by Anglo-American forces.

The next question becomes, what did the Algiers Accord change? According to Middle East Web,

The thalweg, meaning the median course of the Shatt-El-Arab waterway, was designated as the border. The agreement caused the Shah of Iran to withdraw Iranian support for the Kurdish rebellion, which thereupon collapsed.

Further, it states,

However, the treaty was not honored by either side, resulting in the Iran-Iraq war that began in 1980. The main points of the dispute concerned the Shatt El Arab, a waterway that is Iraq's only outlet to the sea, as well disputed islands and territories. In part, the dispute arose because of the shifting course of the Shatt El Arab. Even after the war, the disputes have not been totally resolved.

Finally, according to Wikipedia,

Under international law, one nation cannot unilaterally reject a previously ratified treaty, and the treaty had no clause providing for abrogation by one nation only.

So, we have President Talabani, a Kurd, cancelling the 1975 Algiers Accord which "resolved" the border dispute between Iran and Iraq. He announced the cancellation of the Accord at the same meeting which he, Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, who is Sunni Arab, met with President Barzani in which they signed a "memorandum of understanding" to deepen relations further with their three parties.

The accord resulted in Iran gaining one half of the Shatt al Arab which Iraq had exclusive rights over from 1935 until 1975. The Accord also stopped Iranian support for the Kurdish rebellion.

However, due to the shifting course of the Shatt El Arab, its thalweg, or median course, continously shifts. One would suspect its course, and therefore the thalweg, shifted considerably during the time Saddam drained the marshlands in the 1990s.

Is this simply a land grab by the Iraqi government? Does Talabani suspect that by cancelling the accord, Iran will begin to support Kurds again?

I do not believe that the Iraqi government is in the position to make a land grab from Iran, nor does Talabani suspect that Iran will begin to support the Kurdish rebellion again. However, as stated previously, the "memorandum of understanding" was signed by groups representing approximately 42% of the electorate.

Will this long disputed accord play favor to Shias in the region enhancing them to come online with the "memorandum of understanding" so that Kurdish and Sunni parties gain a majority of representation in the Iraqi Parliment, thereby forcing a new coalition government?

Is Talabani's efforts a means to lessen Iranian influence in Southern Iraq by reigniting the flames of a long disputed region among Iran and Iraq; thereby, preventing IRGC from gaining further influence into Iraqi political structure? The timing of this withdraw declaration would make sense in light of the recent turn-over of the Basra Province.

Saddam used the Shatt al Arab dispute as a reason to invade Iran, but it was not the primary reason for his invasion. The primary reason for his invasion was simply a land grab. The recent revolution in Iran potentially made the country easily able to be conquered due to confusion at the central government while purges were ongoing.

However, sometimes perception is more important than reality. In this case, Talabani re-igniting an old wound, may actually gain favor from some Shia groups allowing his Kurdish and Sunni forces to co-op enough Shias to gain a majority in Parliment, causing the election of a new Prime Minister. To a lessor degree, a resuffling of Cabinet Minister positions more to his and Hashimi's likings will potentially come out of the "memorandum of understanding" at the very least.

If able to co-op other groups within the government, these parties may be able to produce significant ministerial gains, ultimately leading to more influence in the government (with or without Maliki), but more likely to decide the Kirkuk Dispute and new Oil Law in favor of the Kurds and also allow for national reconciliation of Sunnis to a larger degree.

We will have to wait until January's meeting in Cairo to see what benefits Talabani and Hashimi get out of the "memorandum of understanding" and re-ignition of the Shatt al Arab dispute.

Maliki, wanting to maintain power, may very well move his party in alignment with Talabani and Hashimi and away from Badr and Madhi influence. Two of the reasons Maliki has been unsuccessful in pushing for passage of the Kirkuk dispute, a new Oil Law, and National Reconciliation is the weakness of his government, caused by internal disputes between the Mahdi and Badr organizations, and the fact that his own party does not maintain a militia or tribal allegiance strong enough to counter the Mahdi or Badr organizations. Partnering up with Talabani and Hashimi would correct both of these issues while still maintaining a Shia majority in Parliment in general, but allow for more influence of Kurds and Sunnis.

Talabani's National Unity Government proposal may very well fly since it inherently maintains the status quo (PM, President, Vice Presidents), would allow filling of vacant ministerial positions, and strengthen Maliki's position enough to pass the Oil Law, National Reconciliation, and possibly resolve the Kirkuk question. In the run up to elections in early 2009, settlement of these disputes may very well ensure enough popular support to allow all three parties to remain in power.

Politics have always made strange bedfellows. The newly democratic Iraq is no exception. The forming of these alliances would only happen under a democratic system. Saddam was able to keep Iraq together our of share fair. Democracy is forcing parties together out of share lust for power. However, because Iraqis can unelect their leaders now, these parties will have to use their power for the people as opposed to against the people.

Finally, Talabani's National Unity Government has a side effect of decreasing Iranian influence which has historical ties to the Badr Corps and more recent ties to the Mahdi Army.

In many respects, this National Unity Government is a win-win, for Iraq and for the US. If Iranian influence is decreased, it can also be a win for its Arab neighbors.